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The Big March of April 27, 1989 
May 8, 2009 in Uncategorized by The China Beat | No comments 
Wang Chaohua is an independent scholar who received her doctorate from UCLA last year, has written 
political commentaries for periodicals such as the New Left Review, and is the editor of One China, 
Many Paths. A leader of the Tiananmen protests of 1989, she wrote the following essay reflecting on 
the events of twenty years ago for Hong Kong’s Ming Pao newspaper, which will run the original 
Chinese language version soon. Dr. Wang has been good enough to provide us with an English 
language translation to publish here. 
We all know that the large scale, student-led pro-democracy movement that took place in China 
twenty years ago was triggered by the April 15, 1989, death of Hu Yaobang, the former General-
secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). After a stalemate between the government and the 
protesters that lasted for almost two months, the Party eventually gave the order to open fire at the 
masses, resulting in the June Fourth Massacre that saw many peaceful protesters killed or injured by 
military forces. To this day, there has not been an independent investigation into the crime, nor any 
open, reliable counting of the victims. Some facts, though, are clear, such as that the majority of 
victims were not students but ordinary urban residents of Beijing, the capital city. 
However, a careful look at the actual development of events reveals that, in the first ten days or so, 
the great majority of protesters were students. When Hu Yaobang’s funeral was held on April 22 and 
the casket was carried from the funeral site, the Great Hall of People by Tiananmen Square, to its final 
resting place in west suburban Beijing, there were not many people spontaneously lining up the big 
thoroughfare to pay their final tribute to Hu – at least, far fewer than had turned more than a decade 
earlier, when there was a massive showing at the funeral of former Premier Zhou Enlai in January 
1976. Those mourning crowdssent political shock waves through the capital. 
A key early turning point in 1989, when the protest changed from a student movement to a 
movement of the masses, came on April 27, when a big “illegal” march took place in Beijing. It was an 
unprecedented event in the history of the People’s Republic. The immediate cause of the march was a 
notorious editorial, issued by the Party’s mouthpiece, the People’s Daily, on April 26. Social discontent 
had been widespread for some time, due to setbacks of the economic reform (including near-run-away 
inflation in the summer of 1988) and tightened politico-economic control in early 1989 (including 
reissued grocery coupons and reduced space for political commentary or proposals at the annual 
National People’s Congress and National Political Consultative Conference). Deploying formulated 
expressions from the later stage of the Cultural Revolution of the early-to-mid 1970s and full of 
implied threats of political suppression, the April 26 editorial provoked immediate and strong reactions 
among city dwellers. It had been almost a whole decade since the Reform started and general 
reflections on the Cultural Revolution had gone from redressing wrongs to searching for cultural roots 
and to appealing for democracy and renewed enlightenment. Why, the people wondered, did the 
government decide to revert to an “old” sort of rhetoric, just because there had been some student 
protests? 
I still remember vividly the events of those days. On the morning of April 26 we had just announced in 
our first press conference the establishment of the Beijing Association of College Students (BACS, gao 
zi lian). That afternoon, the municipal Party Committee held a meeting in the Great Hall of People of 
ten-thousand Party cadres working in the educational sector, the goal of which was to figure out and 
mobilize support to implement strategies to control the student unrest. In the evening, our newly 
elected BACS president was put under great personal pressure in his student dorm and forced to issue 
a cancellation of the planned march for the next day. The authorities without delay drove him to 
announce the cancellation on major campuses in the wee hours of April 27. Many campuses saw 
student internal conflicts in varied degrees, caused by the confusion. Yet, students from the biggest 
campuses in northwest Beijing broke blocked gates and rushed out to the streets. Soon they joined 
each other to form a considerably huge, mile-long column. 
Most importantly, well before student marchers reached Chang’an Avenue, the main east-west 
thoroughfare across central Beijing through Tiananmen Square, the west section of Chang’an was 
already completely empty of motor vehicles. Urban residents from all directions came to fill the broad 
street, climbing up trees, roofs and billboards along the street, and soon become the major force 
facing the pre-installed police line on the way leading to Tiananmen. It was these people who 
eventually pushed away lines of police right in front of Zhongnanhai, the residential compound of 
Deng Xiaoping and other central Party figures, just to the west of the square. When the marchers kept 
on eastward after passing the Square and along Chang’an Avenue, supporting bystanders grew rapidly 
in both number and enthusiastic energy, creating far greater scenes of protest than the then rather 
exhausted student marchers. 
I was walking on the east stretch of the Second Ring Road by early dusk, when all the sudden public 
loudspeakers on streetlamp poles started broadcasting, after being silent for years since the late 
1970s. They said that the government was ready to initiate public dialogues with people from all walks 
of society. Students and the masses gathered around all broke into cheers. It was rumored at the time 
that the Party elderly leaders were shocked by what they saw on monitoring screen inside 
Zhongnanhai and had to rethink how to deal with the crisis. The previous hawkish line was replaced by 
a softened approach. 
When the Big March of April 27 took place, on the student side, the newborn student organization was 
not only very frail, but had also borne the blow of blackmail from the government in advance. 
Therefore, though the Big March was a surprise success to both students and the government, it was 
not a “victory of Reason” as some intellectuals tend to describe it. Nor was it a movement capable of 
controlling a “victorious retreat,” as some others suggested. Instead, it was a success brought about 
largely by the unprecedented support of the great masses of Beijing. It was a collective refusal by the 
society to go back to the old model of top-down social mobilization and management, formed in the 
post-1969 Cultural Revolution years. The success of the Big March, therefore, powerfully demonstrates 
the political nature of the 1989 protest movement, as well as its essential demands for political reform 
of democratization. 
On the side of the government, how to handle the protest was inevitably entangled in internal power 
struggles from the start. After Hu Yaobang’s funeral on April 22, Zhao Ziyang, the then General-
secretary of the Party, went to visit North Korea, leaving the mess to Party functionaries to be handled 
in an “old fashioned” way that led to the issuing of the April 26 Editorial. On the other hand, the 
turnabout of official policy on the evening of April 27, trailing the success of the Big March, shows that 
internal discord and uncertainty were already present inside the highest level of the Party leadership. 
Policymakers were still searching for ways to get out of trouble–if threatening intimidation did not 
work, then let us try a friendlier face. Following this, then, we saw a number of new moves: partly 
televised – and, again, unprecedented in the PRC – dialogue between the State Council’s 
spokesperson and selected students on April 29; a series of talks Zhao Ziyang gave in early May, 
openly commenting on economic reforms passing the “test of market” and political reforms the “test 
of democratization”; and the unusual permission secured on May 13 by the famous woman journalist 
Dai Qing to publish on a whole page of the official Guangming Daily a forum’s transcript by leading 
liberal intellectuals. How could anyone have imagined these “new directions” had there not been the 
Big March on April 27? To accuse the students of “getting involved in the Party’s internal power 
struggle” after Martial Law was issued on May 20, as if the youngsters uncannily destroyed a 
wonderful promising future, is an unrealistically optimistic view of the situation before that date. 
The fundamental nature of the 1989 Chinese conflict lies in the masses’ demands for the rights of 
political participation, in opposition to the CCP regime’s determination not to share its political power 
with society. To commemorate those who lost their lives in the bloody military suppression, it is 
necessary for us, I believe, to insist on what the “Tiananmen Mothers” group, led by Ding Zilin who 
lost her 17-year-old son to the June Fourth Massacre, has put forward as the principles in dealing with 
this painful historical scar: 
Speaking out the truth; refusing to forget; pursuing justice; and appealing to conscience.  
 
